We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are constrained by attributes possessed by the alternatives (Nehring and Puppe, 2007a,b). Solidarity conditions require that when some parameters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept …xed either all weakly lose or they all weakly win. Population-monotonicity (Thomson, 1983a,b) applies to the arrival and departure of agents, while replacement-domination (Moulin, 1987) applies to changes in preferences. We show that either solidarity property is compatible with voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if and only if the attribute space is quasi-median (Nehring, 2004) , and with Pareto-e¢ ciency if and only if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. JEL classi…cation codes: D63, D71, H41.
Introduction
Unanimity decision rules are used in many political institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council, the rati…cation procedure for treaties in the European Union, and criminal law juries. Surprisingly few justi…cations for such rules are available (Berga, Bergantiños, Massó and Neme, 2004; Ju, 2005) . We provide several characterizations of unanimity in a general public choice problem. Decision rules prescribe an outcome as a function of the preferences submitted by individuals. The set of admissible preferences is constrained by a set of objective attributes possessed by the alternatives: we consider the class of attribute-based domains, introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2007a , 2007b , 2005 , 2010 . Solidarity conditions are the key element in all of our characterizations.
Solidarity is a principle of justice with respect to changes in circumstances. It says that all agents not responsible for these changes should be a¤ected in the same direction.
Possible changes include the arrival or departure of individuals, as well as changes in their preferences. "Replacement-domination" is introduced by Moulin (1987) in the context of quasi-linear binary public decision. It applies to a model with a …xed population of agents and requires that the replacement of the preferences of one agent causes the other agents to either all weakly win or all weakly lose. "Population-monotonicity"is introduced by Thomson (1983a Thomson ( , 1983b in the context of bargaining. It applies to a model with a variable population of agents and requires that when one agent joins the population, the other agents whose preferences are kept …xed either all weakly win or they all weakly lose. 1 In the context of public choice, solidarity conditions are …rst studied in location models. Thomson (1993) considers a continuous line over which agents have single-peaked preferences. For any preference pro…le, a target rule selects the Pareto-e¢ cient alternative that is closest to some exogenously …xed alternative on the line. Thomson (1993) shows that the target rules are the only Pareto-e¢ cient rules that satisfy replacement-domination. 1 For surveys on these two conditions, see Thomson (1995 Thomson ( , 1999 . 2 Ching and Thomson (1997) show that these rules are also the only Pareto-e¢ cient rules that satisfy population-monotonicity. Ching and Thomson (1997) , Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ) extend these results for single-peaked preferences on a tree network. Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ) further shows that the target rules are the only ones that satisfy unanimity (if all agents' preferred alternative is the same, it should be selected), strategy-proofness (reporting true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents) and either condition of solidarity, on a tree network. Finally Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ) extends this second result to Euclidean spaces, when agents'preferences are separable across dimensions and quadratic, and characterizes coordinatewise target rules on this domain. Gordon (2007b) obtains an impossibility result for single-peaked preferences on a circle, except on small discrete domains (less than …ve alternatives) of symmetric preferences. 2 In this paper, we extend the analysis to a larger class of models in which the set of admissible preferences is constrained by a set of objective attributes possessed by the alternatives. This class of domains generalizes discrete versions of all of the locations models listed in the last paragraph. One di¤erence is that these models assume a continuum of alternatives, while we assume a discrete set. This di¤erence is however not fundamental.
The real novelty of our work is that the class of attribute-based domains is larger than the class of domains structured around a location model. For example, the unrestricted domain, the domain of separable preferences over sets of objects (Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou 1991) and models of voting under constraints (Barberà, Massó and Neme, 1997 and 2005) can be viewed as attribute-based domains.
Our starting point, in section 3, is a characterization by Nehring and Puppe (2007b), which mirrors results by Neme (1997, 2005) in the closely related model of voting under constraints These authors show that the rules that satisfy voter-sovereignty (any alternative is selected for some pro…le) and strategy-proofness in any attribute-based domain form a class of "voting by issues" rules which make separate decisions between 2 Solidarity conditions were also studied in the problem of locating multiple public goods by Miyagawa (1998 Miyagawa ( , 2001 ), Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 , and Umezawa (2012) and in the problem of selecting a probabilitic location by Ehlers and Klaus (2001) . These models di¤er from ours in that they include some alternatives which are not considered best by any preference in the domain.
3 each attribute and its complement.
In section 4, we show that in any attribute-based domain, the rules satisfying votersovereignty, strategy-proofness and solidarity, when they exist, are unanimity rules, in which each of the attributes of some prespeci…ed "target"alternative can only be defeated by an unanimous vote. This result can be viewed as a generalization of a discrete counterpart of the similar characterizations by Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ) on trees and Euclidean spaces.
Nehring and Puppe (2007b) have characterized the class of attribute spaces in which unanimity voting by issues rules exist, the "quasi-median" spaces (Nehring 2004) . It follows that the quasi-median domains are exactly the ones where these three conditions are compatible. We provide examples to illustrate how this class of domains extends the discrete counterparts of the domains studied by Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ).
In section 5, we study the compatibility of Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity in attributebased domains. Here, we do not assume strategy-proofness and hence cannot restrict attention to "voting by issues" rules from the outset, but this last condition turns out to be implied by the other two. 3 Unfortunately, our result is negative. "Trees", which are precisely the discrete counterpart of the domains studied by Ching and Thomson (1997), Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 in continuous location models are the only attribute-based domains where the two conditions are compatible. Finally, we provide a characterization on discrete trees, that mirrors the results obtained by these authors in the continuum case.
Our proof di¤ers from theirs, in that we rely on the theory of voting by issues.
The model
In this section, we present the class of attribute-based domains (Nehring and Puppe 2007a,b) . Then we present the …xed and variable population models and the conditions we are interested in.
Let A be a nonempty …nite set of alternatives. Let H 2 A be a non-empty family of 3 In a companion paper, Gordon (2007a) studies Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity in a general public choice problem and establishes several of these conditions' general implications. We defer the discussion of the relation between the two papers to the end of section 5.
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subsets of A, with typical element H A: The elements of H are called attributes. We can think of each of them as a descriptive characteristic relevant for the choice and de…ned by the set of alternatives that possess it. For example, if the set A is a set of possible constitutions for a nation, the attributes could be "federal", "non-federal", "presidential", "parliamentary" and the attribute "presidential" is de…ned as the subset of constitutions in A that are presidential. Suppose that H satis…es the following three conditions. Nontriviality: for all H 2 H, H 6 = ;: Closedness under negation: for all H 2 H, H c 2 H.
Separation: for all x 6 = y 2 A; there is H 2 H such that x 2 H and y = 2 H. A family H that satis…es these three conditions is called an attribute space. 4 Following Nehring (1999), an attribute space enables us to de…ne a notion of betweenness of alternatives as follows. Here are some simple examples. It is important to realize that an attribute space could be much more intricate than the ones shown here. More generally, an attribute space can be de…ned on a tree, de…ned as a graph (set of undirected edges) on A without cycles. For each x 2 A; the set A n fxg can be uniquely represented as the union of two connected components H + x and H x whose intersection is the singleton fxg : The family H of all sets of the form H + x and H x for all x 2 A de…ne an attribute space. A binary relation R i is called a preference if it is re ‡exive, transitive and complete,
i.e. a weak ordering. 5 Let P i and I i be the associated strict preference and indi¤erence relation. Let H be an attribute space. A preference R i is adapted to H if there exists
This means that p (R i ) is the "single peak" of preference R i , i.e. its most preferred alternative. Moreover if a has more attributes (in an inclusion sense) in common with p (R i ) than b; then preference R i prefers a to b:
Let R be the set of preferences, which are adapted to H: In this paper, we focus on domains of preferences, which are adapted to some attribute space:
The line attribute space in Example 1 generates a discrete version of the classic singlepeaked domain on a line studied by Moulin (1980) , Thomson (1993) version of the domain of single-peaked preferences on a circle studied by Gordon (2007a) and Schummer and Vohra (2002) . The unrestricted domain, the domain of separable and single-peaked domains on product of lines are also special cases.
We consider problems with a …xed population and problems with a variable population.
For each, we de…ne a relevant solidarity condition.
Fixed population. Let N be a …xed nonempty …nite set of agents with generic agent denoted by i: A …xed population problem is de…ned by an attribute space H and a …xed population N: Each agent i is equipped with a preference R i 2 R: A preference pro…le is a
A rule is a mapping f : R N ! A: We are interested in solutions such that when the preference of one agent changes, the other agents are all a¤ected in the same direction: either they all weakly win or the all weakly lose.
We assume that jN j 3; which is the minimal cardinality for which replacementdomination has bite.
Variable population. Let N be a …nite set of potential agents with generic agent denoted by i: A variable population problem is de…ned by an attribute space H and a set of potential agents N : It consists of the collection of problems with …xed population (H; N ) for all nonempty N N . A preference pro…le is given by a set N and a list R N 2 R N :
A (variable population) rule is a mapping f :
We are interested in solutions such that when one agent joins the economy and the preferences of the agents already present in the economy are kept …xed, these agents who were present before the change are all a¤ected in the same direction: either they all weakly win or they all weakly lose.
We assume that jN j 3; which is the minimal cardinality for which populationmonotonicity has bite.
In each of these models, we study the compatibility of these conditions with the following additional requirements. A …xed population rule satis…es voter-sovereignty if it is onto, i.e. if every alternative is selected by the rule for some pro…le in its domain. Next, a rule is strategy-proof if revealing their true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for
Last, a rule satis…es Pareto-e¢ ciency, if at any pro…le, there is no alternative that is weakly preferred by all agents in the economy and strictly preferred by at least one agent to the alternative selected by the choice function: for all R N 2 R N , there exists no a 2 A such that for all i 2 N; a R i f (R N ) and for some j 2 N , a P j f (R N ) : A variable population rule f satis…es either of these three properties if for all N; the restriction f N satis…es it. We are interested in rules that satisfy solidarity and either voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness, or Pareto-e¢ ciency.
Voting by issues
In this Section, we present a classic result in the literature, on which our results are based.
It characterizes the class of rules that satisfy voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness as "voting by issues."The results in this section were obtained by Nehring and Puppe (2007b) in the attribute-based framework. Similar results were previously obtained by Neme (1997, 2005 ) in the related model of voting under constraints.
An issue is de…ned as the pair formed by an attribute and its complement. Under "voting by issues," the agents vote separately on each issue, over the two corresponding competing attributes, using an issue-speci…c voting rule for each of the issues. The alternative that is selected is the one that possesses all of the adopted attributes. Of course, such a procedure is well de…ned only if the issue-speci…c voting rules satisfy certain joint restrictions.
More precisely, consider a …xed population problem (H; N ). 
Let W = (W H ) H2H be a structure of winning coalitions. Voting by issues associated with W is the rule f :
In general, the rule f need not be well-de…ned. 6 Nehring and Puppe (2007b) provide the following important characterization.
Proposition 1 (Nehring and Puppe, 2007b) A rule f satis…es voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if and only if it is voting by issues and well-de…ned.
Obviously, this result extends to variable population problems in the following way.
Corollary 1 A variable population rule satis…es voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if for each nonempty N N ; the rule f N is voting by issues and well-de…ned.
An important feature of voting by issues is that the rules in this class always selects an alternative that lies in the convex hull of the peaks of the agents: for all R N 2 R N ;
In particular, for all preference pro…le with exactly two distinct peaks, the choice function selects an alternative that lies between the two peaks: for
6 Nehring and Puppe (2007b) provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition on the structure of winning coalitions under which voting by issues is well-de…ned: the "intersection property." Barberà, Massó and Neme (1997) provide a di¤erent necessary and su¢ cient condition, also labelled "intersection property"
under which separable voting under constraints is well-de…ned. 9 4 Strategy-proofness and Solidarity
In this section, we study the compatibility of voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and either solidarity conditions.
In the last section, we introduced voting by issues. A rule in this class is a unanimity rule if there exists a "target" b a 2 A whose attributes can only be defeated by unanimity, 
If there is such an alternative, it is necessarily unique and it is precisely Proof. It is clear that a unanimity rule satis…es the conditions. We prove the converse implications.
(i) From Proposition 1, we know that f is voting by issues and well-de…ned, characterized by a winning coalition structure Similarly, let R b 2 R be such that p R b = b and for all x = 2 H and all y 2 H; x P b y: Let R N 2 R N such that for all j 2 W; R j := R a and for all j 2 N n W; R j := R b :
Next, let R 0 i := R b : By de…nition of voting by issues, this implies that f (R N
Let R be the pro…le (R a ; R b ; :::; R b ) where R b is repeated jN j 1 times.
Since all the H k for k = 1; :::; l are in H f ; we have f (R) 2 T l k=1 H k = ;; which is a contradiction. Therefore T
Last, we show that this intersection has exactly one element b a:
Therefore there is b a 2 A such that b a = T provide an abstract proof of this fact. For completeness, we provide here a constructive proof of this result, which we believe is more transparent. By construction, x n 2 Co (fx n 1 ; p n g) Co (fx n 2 ; p n 1 ; p n g) ::: Co (fx 1 ; :::; p k g) :
Again by construction, we know that
... and 
Corollary 2
The following three statements are equivalent.
(i) The attribute space H admits a rule that satis…es voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and replacement-domination.
(ii) The attribute space H admits a variable population rule that satis…es voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity.
(iii) H is quasi-median.
Nehring and Puppe (2005) provide several interesting characterizations of quasi-median spaces. We end this section by two examples of such spaces, whose associated domains are not discrete counterparts of the domains considered by Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ).
Example 4 A subset of at most L out of K public projects, with 1 L < K; has to be selected. An alternative speci…es which of the projects will be carried out. Attributes are the sets of alternatives of the form "yes to project k" and "no to project k" for all k = 1; :::; K:
This attribute space has exactly K + 1 median alternatives. These are all the alternatives of the form"only project k is carried out" for all k = 1; :::; K and "no project is carried 5 Pareto-e¢ ciency and Solidarity
In this section, we study the compatibility of Pareto-e¢ ciency and either solidarity conditions. Ching and Thomson (1997) , Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ) have shown that Pareto-e¢ ciency is compatible with either replacement-domination or populationmonotonicity on domains of single-peaked preferences de…ned on trees. 7 Both the set of alternatives and the preference domain these authors consider are continua. Their discrete counterpart in our setting is the class of domains of single-peaked preferences on discrete trees, such as the ones presented in Example 1.
In the light of the results by Ching and Thomson (1997) , Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 , it is natural to ask the following question: Are these properties compatible in other attribute-based preferences domains? Unfortunately, we …nd that the answer to this question is negative: tree structures are the only attribute-based domains on which Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity properties are compatible.
To establish this result, we …rst provide an abstract characterization of the attribute spaces that generate domains in the class presented in Example 1. It is well known and easily veri…ed that the attribute spaces H constructed in Example 1 are median and in addition satisfy the following condition.
Condition (T ) :
For all H; H 0 2 H; at least one of the sets H \ H 0 ; H \ H 0c ; H c \ H 0 ;
H c \ H 0c is empty.
Conversely, we establish that these two conditions, the median condition and (T ), characterize tree structures, a result we believe is of independent interest. 8 From any median attribute space H that satis…es (T ) ; one can recover a discrete graph-theoretic tree, that is a graph (a …nite set of vertices and edges) that is connected (any two vertices are connected through some path) and has no cycles.
Proposition 4 Let H be a median attribute space that satis…es (T ). Then the graph on

A = S
H2H
H whose edges are the pairs (a; b) such that there exists a unique attribute H a 2 H such that a 2 H a and b 2 H c a is a tree, i.e. it is connected and has no cycles.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let H be a tree attribute space.
Step 1: The graph de…ned in the Proposition is connected. It follows immediately from the previous paragraph that the graph de…ned in the Proposition is connected.
Step 2: Monotonicity of attributes along a path.
Let a and b be arbitrary alternatives. Consider a path a 0 ; :::; a n with a 0 = a and a n = b connecting a and b: For all i; since (a i ; a i+1 ) is an edge, there exists exactly one attribute, let it be denoted H i ; such that a i 2 H i and a i+1 = 2 H i : We will show that for all i; we have
Step 3: The graph does not contain any cycles. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a path a 0 ; :::; a n with a n = a 0 . By Step 2, we …nd that H 0 ::: H n H 0 ; a contradiction. We conclude that the graph does not contain any cycles, i.e. it is a tree in a graph theoretic sense.
From now on, a tree attribute space is a median attribute space that satis…es (T ) :
We are now ready to show that Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity are only compatible on tree attribute spaces. Note that we do not assume strategy-proofness, thus we cannot restrict attention to voting by issues from the outset, as we did in the previous section. The idea of proof is the following. We associate to any rule satisfying the conditions a 16 two agents rule, which turns out to be a Pareto-e¢ cient unanimity rule (Steps 1 and 2).
Then in Steps 3 and 4, we show that this implies that H is a tree.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let H be an attribute space.
(i) : Let jN j 3: Let f be a rule that satis…es Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacementdomination.
Let M := f1; 2g and g : R M ! A; such that for all (R 1 ; R 2 ) 2 R M ; we have
Step 1: The rule g satis…es anonymity, strategy-proofness and Pareto-e¢ ciency.
First, it is obvious that the rule g satis…es Pareto-e¢ ciency.
Next, we prove that for all (R 1 ; R 2 ) ; we have g (R 1 ; R 2 ) I i g (R 2 ; R 1 ) for all i 2 f1; 2g.
for all i 2:: Consider the transformation of R 0 N = (R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R 2 ) in R 00 N = (R 2 ; R 1 ; :::; R 1 ) where for each agent i 2 f3; :::; ng ; the preference R 0 i = R 2 is replaced by the preference R 00 i = R 1 in decreasing index order. Then the preference R 0 1 = R 1 is replaced by the preference R 00 1 = R 2 and last the preference R 0 2 = R 2 is replaced by the preference R 00 2 = R 1 : At each step in the transformation, the Pareto-set for the preference subpro…le of the agents whose preferences are kept …xed is the same at the Pareto-set for the entire pro…les (of any pro…le along the path). By Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-domination, this implies that the preferences R 1 and R 2 remain indi¤erent between the images by f along the path. Therefore g (R 1 ; R 2 ) = f (R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R 2 ) I i f (R 2 ; R 1 ; :::; R 1 ) = g (R 2 ; R 1 ) ; for all i 2 f1; 2g.
Last, we prove that g satis…es strategy-proofness. By anonymity, it su¢ ces to prove that for all (R 1 ; R 2 ) 2 R M and all R 0 2 2 R; we have g (R 1 ; R 2 ) R 2 g (R 1 ; R 0 2 ) : We have g (R 1 ; R 2 ) = f (R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R 2 ) : Consider the sequence of transformations where the preference R i = R 2 is replace by the preference R 0 i = R 0 2 ; for each i 2 f2; :::; ng in increasing order. When replacing the preference of an agent of indices in f3; :::; n 1g ; the image by f remains unchanged by the same argument as in the last paragraph. In the …rst replacement, agent 2 cannot strictly bene…t, since this would imply agent 3 strictly bene…ts, which would imply that f R 0 2 ; R N nf2g Pareto-dominates f (R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R 2 ) for (R 1 ; R 2 ) ; i.e. for R N : Similarly, in the last replacement, agent n cannot strictly bene…t. If this where the case, since all agents 1; :::; n 1 are a¤ected in the same direction, these agents must weakly lose (at least one of them strictly), otherwise f (R 1 ; R 0 2 ; :::; R 0 2 ; R 2 ) is not Pareto-e¢ cient for (R 1 ; R 0 2 ; :::; R 0 2 ; R 2 ) : But this in turns contradicts the Pareto-e¢ ciency of f (R 1 ; R 0 2 ; :::; R 0 2 ) for (R 1 ; R 0 2 ; :::; R 0 2 ) : Therefore agent n weakly loses. Last f (R 1 ; R 0 2 ; :::; R 0 2 ) = g (R 1 ; R 0 2 ) : In summary, we obtain that g (R 1 ; R 2 ) R 2 g (R 1 ; R 0 2 ) ; i.e. g satis…es strategy-proofness. Last, since g satis…es strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty, it only depends on the agents'peaks. Therefore, the property established in the second paragraph of Step 1 implies that g satis…es anonymity.
Step 2: The rule g is a unanimity rule. Let b a be the unique alternative such that for
Step 3: The attribute space H satis…es condition (T ) : 9 Suppose by contradiction that H violates condition (T ) : If this is the case, then there are alternatives a 1 ; :::; a 4 2 A and attributes H and H 0 ; such that a 1 2 H \ H 0 ; a 2 2 H \ H 0c ; a 3 2 H c \ H 0c ; and a 4 2 H c \ H 0 : Then b a is an element of exactly one of these four sets. Suppose for example that b a 2 H \ H 0 : Consider now a pro…le (R 1 ; R 2 ) such that p (R 1 ) = a 2 and p (R 2 ) = a 4 ; and moreover for all a 2 H \ H 0 ; we have a 3 P 1 a and a 3 P 2 a: Therefore none of the alternatives in H \ H 0 is Pareto-e¢ cient. However, g (R 1 ; R 2 ) = med (b a; p (R 1 ) ; p (R 2 )), which is an element of H \ H 0 , contradicting Paretoe¢ ciency. Therefore the attribute space H satis…es condition (T ) :
Step 4: The space H is a median space: Suppose, by contradiction that H is not a median space. Then, we know from Nehring and Puppe (2007b, Proposition 4.1) that there is a family of attributes H 1 ; :::; H k ; with k 3; such that T k l=1 H l = ; and for each h 2 f1; :::; kg ; T l6 =h H l 6 = ;:For each h = 1; :::; k; let a j 2 T l6 =h H l : For each pair l; l 0 ; l 6 = l 0 ; the sets H l \ H l 0 ; H c l \ H l 0 and H l \ H c l 0 are non-empty. Therefore, by Step 3, it must be that, for each pair l; l 0 ; l 6 = l 0 ; H c l \ H c l 0 = ;: Therefore any alternative a 2 A is an element of exactly k 1 sets H l and one set H l 0 :
Without loss of generality, let's suppose that b a 2 H 1 \:::\H k 1 \H c k : Consider now a pro…le (R 1 ; R 2 ) such that p (R 1 ) = a 1 and p (R 2 ) = a 2 : Then g (R 1 ; R 2 ) = med (b a; p (R 1 ) ; p (R 2 )) ;
; this is a contradiction. Therefore H is a median space: Therefore H is a tree attribute space.
(ii) : The proof follows exactly the same steps, therefore we only provide a sketch. Let jN j 3: Let f be a variable-population rule that satis…es Pareto-e¢ ciency and populationmonotonicity. Let g be the restriction of f to R M with M := f1; 2g : Each preference replacement in the proof of (i) is achieved in two steps by …rst withdrawing the agent whose preference is replaced and then adding him back with the new preference. At the end, all agents with labels other than 1 and 2 are removed. The remaining steps are identical to those in (i).
To end this section, we provide the discrete counterparts of the characterizations obtained by Ching and Thomson (1997) , Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999 Klaus ( , 2001 ) on trees. 10 Our proof di¤ers from theirs, as it relies on the theory of voting by issues and does not require an in…nite set of alternatives. (ii) Let jN j 3: Let f be a variable population rule. Then f satis…es Pareto-e¢ ciency and population-monotonicity if and only if f is a unanimity rule.
Proof. It is clear that a unanimity rules satis…es the conditions. We prove the converse implication. Throughout the proof, let H be a tree. and b 2 [p (R i ) ; p (R j )] : We will transform the pro…le R N into the pro…le R 0 N such that R 0 1 = R i and R 0 2 = ::: = R 0 n = R j : Step 1. First, let L := N n fi; jg : Let R 0 l := R j : Replace one by one the preference R l of each agent l 2 L by R 0 l := R 2 : Once this is done, we obtain the pro…le R 0 N such that R 0 i = R i and R 0 l = R j for all l 6 = i: If i = 1; the transformation ends here. If not, then 1 6 = i; so that R 0 1 = R j : In this case, let R 00 1 := R i and R 00 i := R j : Replace …rst the preference R 0 1 = R j by R 00 1 = R i and then the preference R 0 i = R 1 by the preference R 00 i = R 2 : The transformation ends and we obtain the pro…le R 00 N such that R 00 1 = R i and R 00 2 = ::: = R 00 n = R j : At each elementary step in this transformation, there are always at least two agents whose preferences are kept …xed and are R i and R j : We will show that the image by f remains b along the path. Along the path, the set of preferences represented in the pro…le decreases or remains constant at each step. By Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-domination, this implies that the change weakly bene…ts preferences R i and R j . Since this is true at each step, and by transitivity, it must be that f (R 00
N ) = g (R 00 1 ; R 00 2 ) = g (R i ; R j ) = med (b a; p (R i ) ; p (R j )) : By de…nition of a ; we know that a 2 [a ; p (R j )] \ [a ; p (R i )] : By de…nition of i and j, we know that a 2 [p (R i ) ; p (R j )] : Therefore med (b a; p (R i ) ; p (R j )) = a ; i.e. f (R N ) = f b a (R N ) : Since this is true for all R N 2 R N ; we conclude that f is the unanimity rule with status quo b a:
(ii) The proof follows exactly the same steps, therefore we only provide a sketch. In this case the rule g is the restriction of the variable-population rule f to R f1;2g : Each preference replacement in the proof of (i) is achieved in two steps by …rst withdrawing the agent whose preference is replaced and then adding him back with the new preference.
Last all agents with labels other than 1 and 2 are removed. 20 Vohra (1999) and Klaus (2001) both point out that their characterization on trees is valid even in the subdomain of symmetric preferences. This is not the case in the discrete setting, as shown in the following example.
Example 6 Let A := f0; 1; xg ; with x 2: Consider the domain of preferences represented by the utility functions u 0 (a) = jaj ; u 1 (a) = ja 1j and u x (a) = ja xj for all a 2 A: Then the rule, which for any preference pro…le maximizes the linear ordering x 0 1 on the set of Pareto-e¢ cient alternatives satis…es the conditions of Proposition 6 and is not the restriction to this domain of any voting by issues rule.
We end this section by discussing the relation between the results by Gordon (2007a) and the ones in this paper. Gordon (2007a) considers a general variable population public choice problem, without assumptions on the preference domain, other than symmetry (all agents have the same set of possible preferences) and that the set of alternatives does not depend on the population. In this very general framework, Gordon (2007a) does not provide a characterization, but establishes that under Pareto-e¢ ciency, both population-monotonicity the one hand, and replacement-domination together with replication-indi¤erence (the decision change that follows the cloning replication of the entire population leaves all agents indi¤erent) have the following strong implications. First, either combination implies strategy-proofness and even the stronger requirement of groupstrategy-proofness (no group of agents can jointly bene…t from misrepresenting the preferences of its members). Second, they imply anonymity (up to Pareto-indi¤erence). Third, they imply that there is a "status-quo alternative"that is always Pareto-dominated by the choice of the rule. These results are obtained under the assumption that the population is variable and that the set N is in…nite. 11 In contrast, we do not assume that such an in…nite variable population is available and focus on a more restricted class of models. Our results con…rm that, in this more speci…c 1 1 In a similarly general framework, Bu (2013) establishes a general equivalence between false-nameproofness, which requires non-manipulability via the creation of …ctitious identities, and strategy-proofness, anonymity and population-monotonicity. It would be interesting to study the implications of false-nameproofness in the class of attribute-based preference domains. context, the above implications remain true as long as the …xed population has at least three agents in the …xed population model, or as long as there are at least three potential agents in the variable population model, and without the assumption of replication-indi¤erence.
The status quo alternative of a unanimity rule on a tree is its target b a: Moreover, both anonymity and the existence of a status quo alternative are also shown to be implications of the weaker conditions of voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and solidarity.
